Self-Handicapping

Self-handicapping behaviors are described as “impediments to performance that people construct to protect or enhance their perceived competence.” Such self-imposed obstacles are often used by individuals who wish to establish an excuse that may direct attributions of success or failure away from themselves. The idea is to establish an external attribution to avoid internal attributions from others.

A recent article by Temple University researcher David A. Hoffman focuses on the usage of self-handicapping by business managers, particularly those high achievers who are under a greater pressure to duplicate past successes. The widely held opinion of corporate jurists seems to be that legislation can establish methods to deter the presence of self-handicapping managers, and more recently there is a movement to instate further legal sanctions that increase personal liability.

However, Hoffman warns that increasing liability may actually lead to unpredictable changes in managing behaviors, including a possible increase in self-handicapping. The researcher suggests that an idea called the Rational Choice Model helps explain where many instances of bad management may stem from. This model says that disloyalty is a main motivator of bad management, because “managers lack incentives and sanctions that align their incentives with the shareholders.” New business practices are often designed, therefore, to increase managers’ personal interests and liability for company success, through such principles as stock allocations, targeted fees, and legal sanctions.

These practices may in fact backfire: managers slack as a method of self-handicapping in response to increased liability and personal involvement. One study by Berglas and Jones using a placebo drug shows how people will willingly decide to take a drug that claims to either boost or decrease intellectual performance as a method of self-handicapping. Similarly, managers may perform inadequately and seek to create external attributions for company failures as a result of increased pressure to perform well.

A good compromise could most likely be reached by giving management some- but not too much- personal liability, and holding individuals accountable for their actions to discourage self-handicapping.

Hoffman, David A.,Self-Handicapping and Managers' Duty of Care. Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 42, p. 803, 2007; Temple University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2007-09. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=978200

Baumeister, R. F., & Bushman, B. J. (2008). Social psychology and human nature. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.